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NEW PLAYERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
STAGE
PeterJ. Spiro*

I.

INTRODUCTION.

International law and relations have been until recent years more or
less the exclusive preserve of nation-states. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, states have served as the sole repository of international
rights and duties; with few narrow exceptions, they have been the only
entities to enjoy international legal personality. This fundament of
international law in turn has reflected the dominance of states in
international relations during the Westphalian period. That is, global
power has been overwhelmingly concentrated in states and the governments that control them.
That concentration of real-world power appears now to be diffusing.
As borders become more porous, communications more seamless, and
security requirements less preemptive, nation-states are facing new rivals
on the international stage. Corporations, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and international and regional organizations have all emerged
as significant independent forces in a post-Cold War world. At the same
time as these non-state or supra-state entities have taken on an enhanced
international profile, nation-states have themselves been weakened by
internal fragmentation. This fragmentation is evidenced by the increased
international activities of subnational governments, and of national
legislative and judicial bodies. It is also highlighted by the emergence
and recognition of numerous smaller and so-called micro-states. The
change in the relative powers of state and non-state actors is thus
compounded.!
And yet international law has taken little account of this develop* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. A.B., 1982, Harvard
College; J.D., 1987, University of Virginia.
1. See generally Jessica T. Mathews, Powershift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50.
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ment in the distribution of international influence. The state, for the most
part, has retained its monopoly on international legal status. Only states
have full standing in international policymaking and judicial forums.
The dilution of the real-world primacy of nation-states should
prompt a reexamination of the doctrinal core of international law. That
is what makes the subject of this symposium issue such a timely one. I
hope here briefly to introduce the variety of new actors and the context
in which they appear to thrive at the expense of the traditional state.
Section I sets forth circumstantial factors which have breached national
borders and challenged state authority, in turn facilitating the growth of
non-state power. Section II describes those actors beyond the state that
now command some independent legal standing in international affairs.
Section IV explores the possible advantages of enhanced legal status for
non-state actors, which would advance the legitimacy of international
lawmaking processes at the same time as it holds non-state actors more
accountable in the exercise of their substantial powers.
I1. THE NEW GLOBAL STAGE.
What makes this era different from all others? The assumption may
be skeptically received, as well it should be. Such claims have perhaps
an all too familiar ring. The pages of even recent history are littered with
loudly trumpeted, but ultimately false, new dawns on global politics. In
the wake of each of this century's world wars, most notably, wellmeaning elites pressed elaborate visions of international cooperation and
perpetual peace, exemplified, respectively, by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact outlawing war and the post-World War I world federalist movement. Both, of course, were soon crushed by apparently irrepressible
conflict, and indeed they are remembered today mostly as historical
trifles.
The demonstrated durability of state powers should thus make one
pause in predicting the nation-state's decline. But there is perhaps some
cause to believe that things really have changed, at the same time as one
must be careful not to slip into utopian fantasies. The grip of the state is,
I think, being undermined by at least three more fundamental systemic
developments in the nature of the international dynamic: the global
communications revolution, regulatory competition among states, and the
diminished priority of territorial security.
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1. Embedded political interdependence and the revolution in global
communications.
Transboundary communications now appear beyond the capacity of
any one state to control. Global networks are now simply too dense to
marshall from any center. In the old world, contact across state lines was
channeled, in all important respects, through national executives.
Diplomats spoke as the sole representatives not just of governments but
also of peoples. In the new world, virtually any individual can, by use of
the private mails, telephone lines, or the internet, establish direct
international connections independent of governments (hence the
relatively new moniker "citizen diplomat"). The phenomenon is one only
of the last few years and so may mark a significant temporal divide
between today's speculations of change and their stillborn counterparts
from earlier eras.
How does the global communications revolution tend to undermine
state power? At the domestic level, it has facilitated the organization of
interests opposed to the state, so that authoritarian designs are harder to
maintain. (For example, during the Cold War era, xerox machines were
among the most tightly controlled commodities in East Bloc countries.)
These interests also may be organized across state boundaries. Domestic
human rights groups will be bolstered at the international level by groups
such as Amnesty International, again to the detriment of unaccountable
state control. At a less confrontational level, other types of non-national
identities - social, cultural, and economic - are more easily solidified
in the wake of enhanced cross-boundary contact. Because the state is no
longer able to manage these contacts, the resulting transnational
coalitions may not serve state interests. As Jean-Marie Gu~henno
observes, "in the age of networks, the relationship of citizens to the body
politic is in competition with the infinity of connections they establish
outside it."2 This "embedded interdependence" constrains state action
and control.
2.

The integration of the global marketplace.

In part as a consequence of improved communications and of
changes in the focus of economic activity, the global economy also poses
a substantial threat to the continued primacy of the state. Greater mobility

2.

JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE 19 (1995).
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in elements of production is giving rise to more intense regulatory
competition among states.' For example, if a software manufacturer can
locate his engineers or draw from the local labor pool in any of a number
of countries, he can shop for the most favorable national regulatory
environment. States will have a corresponding incentive to accede to the
producer preferences, among which will be a preference for lower levels
of regulation as well as lower tax rates. To the extent that states are no
longer able to extract taxes in a monopoly setting (as they did with
respect to immobile capital and to segmented markets), their treasuries
will be strained and their capacities for intervention correspondingly
limited.
Similarly, global communications now allow a variety of financial
transactions to be undertaken from any location. This, too, undermines
states in their traditional role as market regulators. The increasing
ungovernability of world financial systems may have increasingly
significant implications as markets grow more important (and vulnerable)
within a globally integrated economy.
Even assuming states could coordinate regulation with sufficiently
comprehensive global coverage in response to increased mobility, such
international action likely would require the cession of certain responsibilities to supranational institutions. This transfer of power upwards has
also occurred with respect to the most significant problem of the global
commons, namely that of environmental protection.
3.

The diminished need for state protection.

In a world of hostile competition among territorial groupings, the
state's ultimate promise of military security overshadows all other needs.
State power is at its most concentrated during wartime. A defining
characteristic of the nation-state is its monopoly over the instruments of
force. Survival is a basic instinct and where it is threatened all else will
be sacrificed; thus state activity is tolerated in the external realm which
would be unacceptable in the domestic. The grossest abuses of authority,
in democratic and non-democratic regimes alike, are almost predictably

3. For a law-and-economics explanation of this trend, see John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of

the Western Nation-State and the Rise of the Regime of InternationalFederalism, 18 CARDOZO L.
REv. 903 (1996); see also GUtHENNO, supra note 2, at 8-10 (noting the decreased importance of

territory to industrial activity, so that the economy has become "immaterial" in nature).
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undertaken to repel foreign enemies, real or invented.4
Today, the threat of armed conflict appears more remote, at least in
the developed world, than at any other time in modem history. As long
ago explained by Immanuel Kant, democratic states tend not to fight one
another; as the realm of democracy expands, the zone of peace grows
larger. That tendency can also be viewed as both the cause and the result
of the integrative developments described above. To the extent that states
are less security-minded, they will have less incentive to maintain control
of cross-border contacts. (Indeed they may have less incentive to control
the borders themselves.) To the extent that such contacts are allowed to
occur, transnational interests tend to consolidate and to further diminish
the likelihood of armed state-to-state conflict.5 If domestic interests
(political, economic, or social) perceive a substantial net loss from
interstate conflict, it will not likely occur. Those interests appear to be
crystallizing, both among economic actors (corporations that have
evolved into truly transnational entities heavily dependent on trade) as
well as along political and social lines of affinity (environmentalists,
women, ethnic groups, etc.). Assuming that the demand for armed
protection continues to diminish, state power will also decline.
These three developments in the spheres of communications,
economics, and defense, all set into motion since the end of the Cold
War, would seem to mark important turning points. At the same time,
there do remain grounds for hesitation in pronouncing a watershed of
Westphalian magnitude. After all, capital flows at the eve of World War
I were estimated at rates surpassing today;6 and the major states of
Europe were linked not only at the level of the ordinary conscript
(through the emerging international labor movement) but also at the level
of crowns, whose holders were mostly not-so-distant relatives. Over the
centuries, world peace has been repeatedly declared, and the state has
long been savaged as a declining institution.
Yet I suspect that this round of next-wave thinking may be
vindicated. It may be that earlier predictions of the nation-state's decline
were simply premature. Recent analyses are more sober and less

4. From our own experience, the infamous Korematsudecision stands out as one which surely
would not have been tolerated during peacetime. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (upholding wartime order excluding U.S. citizens of Japanese descent from Pacific Coast
areas).
5. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUa.
J. INTL L. 503, 512-13 (1995)
6. See Louis W. Pauly, CapitalMobility, State Autonomy and Political Legitimacy, 48 J.

INT'L AF. 369, 371 (1995).
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visionary than their intellectual precursors; they come not in the wake of
vast destruction (as did world-order movements following the world
wars) but rather of apparent triumph (with the fall of iron curtain). The
new paradigms, in short, are more grounded in realities than wishful
thinking, and are thus more credible.

I.

THE NEW ACTORS.

Predictions of state decline at least are credible enough to contemplate seriously the implications for the international legal order. A variety
of non-state, supra-state, and sub-state actors (both as a cause and a result
of diminished state power) have become more prominent at the international level as forces independent of state control, at least to some
degree. This non-state power plays out not only in international
decisionmaking processes (for instance, with respect to norm formulation)
but also on the ground. And non-state power takes the form of action as
well as influence.
By way of caveat, I do not mean to suggest that states have lost
their place as the leading player in international relations. States still
plainly overshadow other actors as the primary progenitors, agents, and
enforcers of international law, and their real-world powers remain vast.
State behavior will appropriately continue to command the commentators' principal attention.7 Institutions with three-hundred-year pedigrees
do not disappear in mere decades; 8 the state will need be grappled with
for many years to come. I do argue, however, that the state no longer
warrants our exclusive concern. The presence of other entities pose new
challenges for international law in its making, study, and application.
Existing conceptions of international law are grounded in the notion that
everything begins and ends with the state. That is no longer true as a
matter of fact. It should thus no longer gird the framework of the law.9
7. For an argument that predictions of the demise of the nation-state are "vastly overstated",
see Mark L. Movsesian, The PersistentNation State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1081 (1996).
8. As demonstrated by the last seismic shift in international relations: The Holy Roman
Empire was not formally disbanded until 1806, at least a century after it ceased to command significant geopolitical powers.
9. I do not here deal with the phenomenon of regional or international organizations.
Although these entities are no doubt also playing an increasingly significant role in international
affairs, their participation poses less of a challenge to longstanding approaches to the question of
international legal personality. The conventional analysis would run that because they are composed
of, and formally accountable to, state members, supra-state entities derive international legal
personality from their members, and only to the extent so delegated by those members. Insofar as
the functional requirements of maintaining an organization give rise to questions of personality
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What follows is a brief introduction to the most important non-state
actors (NGOs, corporations, and subnational governments) and a concise
description of the nature of their international presence and the legal
status that is now accorded them.
1.

Non-governmental organizations(NGOs).

NGOs are hardly new to the international scene. The Catholic
Church is perhaps the original NGO, and the labor movement provides
the other significant example of transnational non-governmental
organizing from earlier eras.10 While both remain quintessential models
today, they are now joined by a throng. An almost infinite variety of
groupings has spawned institutional vehicles in the form of NGOs
(defined as organizations of non-national definition and not-for-profit
orientation). Among the more prominent NGO grouping are environmentalists, human rights advocates, women, children, gays, the elderly,
consumers, and indigenous peoples, each of which has mobilized at the
international level.
Many NGOs at least purport to represent memberships, and many
act as advocates in and out of international institutional settings.
Greenpeace and Amnesty International are perhaps the most prominent
examples of the modem advocacy NGO. These advocacy NGOs are
noteworthy in at least two important respects. First, they now act directly
to influence international decisionmaking institutions and not only
through the channel of "home states". Thus, a Greenpeace or Amnesty
International will not stop at having members or national sections lobby
their own governments (although they will do that, too). Rather, they will
move into the international stream as transnational entities seeking
leverage wherever available. For example, a Greenpeace (with a largely
North Atlantic membership) has had its positions voiced and advanced

independent of the member states, that personality has been found to exist by necessary implied
powers. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.CJ. 174
(Apr. 11). As regional and international organizations (including such specialized agencies as the
World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization)
assume a greater degree of functional independence from their state constituents, however, the role
of these institutions may also pose difficult questions of legal status. See Christoph Schreuer, The
Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigmfor InternationalLaw?, 4 EuR. J. INT'L

L. 447, 450 (1993).
10. On the history of NGOs up until World War II, see generally LYMAN C. WHr,
THEIR PURPOSES, METHODS AND
INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS (1951).
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by delegations from small island states and lesser developed countries.

I

outside the control of
In that fashion, advocacy NGOs become players
2
the states from which they nominally hale.'

These NGOs have also been afforded a limited formal status in
some international decisionmaking contexts. Pursuant to article 71 of the
U.N. Charter, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has extended

"consultative status" to international NGOs satisfying certain basic
criteria. Recognition entitles an NGO access to ECOSOC proceedings

and, for the more prominent organizations, rights to lodge oral and
written interventions as well as to propose agenda items. 3 NGOs have
also been afforded limited rights of participation at UN-sponsored world
conferences in recent years, including at Rio (on the environment), Cairo
(population), and Beijing (women). 4 Conferences on multilateral pacts
on climate change and endangered species have afforded NGOs a place
as observers to treaty monitoring proceedings. But in no institution save
the International Labour Organisation have NGOs been formally
extended a status even approaching parity with that of states. Nor have
5 with
NGOs been afforded standing in international judicial forums,
6
organizations.'
prominent exceptions at the level of regional
In practice, NGO influence has far exceeded that indicated by their
tentative formal standing in international institutions. 7 NGOs have

11. For a description of Greenpeace's coordination of such delegations in negotiations
regarding the disposal of hazardous wastes, see Jennifer Clapp, The Toxic Waste Trade With LessIndustrialised Countries: Economic Linkages and PoliticalAlliances, 15 THIRD WORLD Q. 505,
509-12 (1994).
12. See ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA 1I. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 251 (1995) ("[this
burgeoning array of NGOs is the one element of the system that is not even in theory subject to
governmental control").
13. On the consultative status system, and recent efforts to reform it, see Dianne Otto,
Nongovernmental Organizations in the UnitedNations System: The Emerging Role ofInternational
Civil Society, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 107 (1996). See also E.S.C. Res. 1996/31 (updating consultative
status arrangements).
14. For excerpts from representative rules governing NGO participation in these and other
world conferences, see Global Environment Facility, Participation By Non-Governmental
Organizations In The Global Environment Facility, U.N. Doe. GEF/PA.93/2/Annex 2 (1993).
15. See Dinah Shelton, The Participation ofNongovernmental Organizations in International
JudicialProceedings,88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Additional Protocolto the European Social CharterProvidingfor a System of
Collective Complaints(Nov. 9, 1995), 34 I.L.M. 1453 (1995). In an exceptional recent development,
France submitted to arbitral proceeding against Greenpeace to set damages for the sinking of the
Rainbow Warrior. See PanelOders France to Pay $18.1 Million to Greenpeace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 1987, at A2.
17. See, e.g., THOMAS PRINCEN & MATrIHAS FINGER, ENvRONMENTAL NGOS INWORLD
PoLITICs: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL (1994); Felice Gaer, Reality Check: Human
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prompted states to undertake significant international legal initiatives,
especially with respect to human rights and environmental protection.
They have also been able to pursue global political agendas outside of
institutions, either by shaming states (or other relevant actors, most
notably corporations) through exposure and/or by mobilizing sympathetic
consumer constituencies within the integrated global economy. The
former is by now a well-honed tactic of the human rights movement
through which objectives are secured by public relations mechanisms.
The recent controversy surrounding Royal Dutch Shell's proposed
scuttling of an oil rig in the North Sea presents one recent example of
the latter. Shell had received all appropriate domestic and international
approvals to leave the Brent Spar rig on the ocean floor. Greenpeace
objected and launched a campaign to boycott Shell gasoline. Within
weeks, Shell's sales in Germany were down 30%, at which point the oil
giant relented.' Shell has since sought out Greenpeace for consultations
in planning the decommission of other rigs.19 Similar tactics were
deployed against France to protest its recent nuclear testing program in
the South Pacific. Although the tests were completed as planned, the
success of Greenpeace's consumer action campaign may have contributed
to France's decision not to undertake more tests in the future.2 °
Brent Spar-type tactics are effective in proportion to a corporation's
or state's dependence on consumer trade. The potential for such activity
will be enhanced by further integration of the global marketplace, which
increases the exposure of target states and corporations. 2' Granted, the
mechanism may remain exceptional. Groups such as Greenpeace
obviously cannot effectively attack every objective through outright
confrontation. But the threat of membership mobilization will make
repetitive deployment unnecessary in some cases. Potential targets may
accede to NGO demands, or at least come to an informal negotiating

Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN in NGOS, THE UN & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51
(Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996).
18. See Tony Paterson, North Sea Shell Game: Greenpeace's Campaign Against Oil
MultinationalRoyal Dutch Shell, THE EUROPEAN, June 30 - July 6, 1995.
19. See Shell Discusses Future of Brent Spar With Greenpeace, EUR. ENV'T, Jan. 23, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World library, Allwld file.
20. See, e.g., Craig R. Whitney, France EndingNuclear Tests That Causes Broad Protests,
N.Y. TwEs, Jan. 30, 1996, at Al; Greenpeace to Go to Court to Get Back Seized Boats and
Helicopter, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, AFP file
(reporting substantial drop in international orders for Beaujolais Nouveau wine in wake of nuclear
test protests).
21. For an elaboration on the phenomenon of extrainstitutional activism, see Paul Wapner,
PoliticsBeyond the State: EnvironmentalActivism and World Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311 (1995).
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table, out of an awareness that consumer campaigns have worked in the
past. There will also be episodes in which the possible costs of boycott
efforts will not outweigh the benefits of the activity that the NGO seeks
to halt. This may help to explain Shell's continued presence in Nigeria
notwithstanding objections to the human rights practices of the current
regime there.' While NGO power is not absolute, it is significant and
growing.
2.

Corporations.

As with the case of NGOs, corporations have long enjoyed a
presence at the international level. The Hudson's Bay and British East
India Companies were effectively sovereign over their far-flung trading
realms, engaging in such characteristically governmental activity as
coining currency, concluding treaties, and making war.23 During the
1960s and 1970s, the activities of multinational corporations were
subjected to international scrutiny in the face of lesser developed country
claims of capitalist exploitation.24
In the interwar era of the 1920s and 1930s, the International
Chamber of Commerce participated in a variety of League of Nations
proceedings and even signed some League instruments as a party.25
Corporate alliances such as the ICC now participate in international
contexts as NGOs, subject to the same requirements and enjoying the
same rights as others under the consultative status system. Corporate
interests have also organized themselves for the issues of the day, for
example, by forming a highly effective Business Council on Sustainable
Development to participate in multilateral forums relating to the
international environment.26
Corporations so grouped thus enjoy some formal status in international institutions. But, as with NGOs, the status is decidedly second

22. For another example of such corporate cost-benefit balancing, see Seth Mydans, Pepsi
Courts Myanmar PreferringSales to Politics,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at D6.
23. See PmIp JESSuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 22 (1968).
24. An institutional relic of that uproar is still found in the UN Commission on Transnational
Corporations.

25. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that ICC delegate signed League instruments
relating to importlexport restrictions and customs formalities).
26. See Hugh Faulkner, Some Comments on the INC Process, in NEGOTIATING CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE Rio CONVENTION 229-37 (Irving M. Mintzer & J.A. Leonard

eds., 1994) (analysis by the Executive Director of the Business Council for Sustainable Development
on the role of corporations in the climate change process).
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class even as real world corporate power grows.2 7 Except at the ILO,
the corporate community does not enjoy a seat at the table, at least not
in its own name. Corporations generally have no standing in public
international judicial and dispute resolution bodies, even where they
effectively may be the only real parties in interest. This may have been
the case with the first decision handed down by the new World Trade
Organization dispute resolution panel, which, though styled as a dispute
between Brazil and the United States, was in fact more a dispute between
two oil companies.
Excluding corporate actors from formal decisionmaking processes,
as well as absolving them from ultimate accountability under international law, may have made sense in a world in which corporations had a
clear national identity and could be adequately represented by and
through particular states. Until recent years, this has held more or less
true. Even during their vilification during the sixties and seventies, the
so-called "multinationals" qualified as such by virtue of a mere presence
in more than one country. The moniker "multinational" has not, at least
until recently, implied true multinationality in the sense of being under
the ultimate control of more than one nation, and thus in a sense being
in the control of none. The United American Fruit Company, for
example, was multinational insofar as it had operations in several Latin
American countries, but it was exclusively a U.S. enterprise at its core,
clearly governed by the dictates of U.S. law.
Today such national identity and control is no longer so apparent.
Some large corporations are becoming truly multinational in the sense
that it is now almost meaningless to describe them as, say, American or
British or Dutch. 29 Even a corporation so intertwined with U.S. foreign
relations as Coca-Cola is now moving to shed its national roots. 0 The
increasingly cosmopolitan nature of international corporate giants is
reflected in corporate structures that make them difficult to regulate from

27. See Jonathon I. Charney, TransnationalCorporationsandDevelopingPublicInternational
Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 749-54 (summarizing limited status of corporations under current inter-

national law).
28. See G. Richard Shell, Participationof Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade
Organization: The Trade StakeholdersModel and Participationby Nonstate Partiesin the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INrL ECON. L. 359, 368 & n.53 (1996).

29. Cf Robert B. Reich, THE WORK OF NATIONS 113 (1991) (describing multinational origin
of "American" automobiles).
30. See Glenn Collins, Coke Drops 'Domestic' and Goes One World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,

1996, § 1,at 35 (reporting elimination of distinctions between domestic and international operations
for purposes of internal corporate structure).
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any single state.
Indeed, it is becoming increasingly difficult for states to regulate
even those corporations that maintain a strong national identification. As
global capital becomes more mobile and the global economy more
competitive, state efforts to constrain corporations may be doomed to fail
in some contexts. The United States, for example, would find it very
difficult, at best, to impose its domestic minimum wage laws on a U.S.
corporation's operations in Malaysia, for to do so would place the U.S.
corporation at a disadvantage against competitors from other nations not
subject to the same regulation. In turn, a developing state like Malaysia
could not itself impose a minimum wage so long as other countries did
not do the same, for to do so would likely force the U.S. corporation to
relocate outside Malaysia. To the extent this description now reflects
real-world conditions, the corporate community itself could become an
ultimate repository of power.
No wonder that NGOs have moved on some issues to influence
corporate behavior directly, rather than indirectly by winning state
regulation to the same effect. Such has been the case with the Brent Spar
incident and other boycott efforts. It has also characterized the shareholder responsibility movement, in which progressive interests enjoying large
shareholding interests (most notably, U.S. state and local pension funds
as well as churches) pressure corporations through shareholder resolutions to adhere to environmental and human rights practices beyond those
required by domestic or international law.
3.

Subnationalgovernments.

Subnational governments are assuming an unprecedented role in
global affairs." Subnational governments active at the international
level include provinces, localities, and perhaps most notably the
constitutive units of federative nation-states. The international profile of
subnational governments has been most enhanced in recent years in the
economic and cultural spheres. Sister-city arrangements blossomed in the
1980s, and it is now routine for subnational officials to undertake
international promotional campaigns (through trade delegations or
permanent trade offices) to attract foreign investment into their jurisdic-

31.

See, e.g., BRIAN HOCKING, LOCALIZING FOREIGN POLICY: NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS

AND MULTI-LAYERED DIPLOMACY (1993); Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in
Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821 (1989).
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tions.32 These activities have been facilitated by advances in global
travel and communications, as well as by the global economic integration
that makes transnational investment possible (and indeed necessary) to
economic growth.
Subnational action has also had political implications at the global
level. Conduct on the part of U.S. states in the areas of tax policy33 and
the treatment of aliens (on both an individual and collective basis)34 has
raised the ire of foreign governments. Even where subnational practice
involves areas of core traditional authority (criminal or family law, for
example) international norms may now elevate those practices to
international significance. These cameo appearances by subnational
authorities indicate that they may have interests at the international level
distinct from the nation-states of which they are a part.
The fact of distinctive subnational interests is increasingly reflected
in domestic policymaking structures. Federal units in such nations as
Germany, Switzerland, and Canada have been afforded constitutional
powers at the international level, in particular to enter into certain types
of international agreements.35 In Belgium, the interests of ethnic
communities (the Flemish, Walloons and a small ethnic German
population) are formally and informally balanced at the international
level so that the communities have fairly advanced international
capacities (again, especially with respect to agreements) at the same time
that they exercise effective veto power over national foreign policy
positions. In the U.S., states officials have won a formal consultative role
in the trade agreement negotiating process.36

32. On the latter, see generally STATES & PROVINCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
(Douglas M. Brown & Earl H. Fry eds., 1993).
33. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (considering California
state tax scheme condemned by foreign governments and corporations); HOCKING, supra note 31,

at 130-51 (setting forth context for same).
34. With respect to the treatment of individuals, international protest has often been provoked
by the treatment of foreign individuals in state criminal justice systems. See, e.g., Sharon Waxman,
FranceWants Prisonerin Texas Transferred,WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1994, at A38; Ronald Smothers,

British-American Is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at 7. See generally Ronan
Doherty, Note, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal Law Implicates
Federal Responsibility Under International Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 1281 (1996). California's

Proposition 187, under which undocumented aliens are barred from state social service and
educational benefits, presents perhaps the most harsh treatment of aliens. See Peter J. Spiro, The
States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 158, 165-66
(noting Mexican government opposition to the state ballot measure).
35. See Schreuer, supra note 9, at 450.

36. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2114c(2)(a) & 2155(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996) (establishing advisory
capacity for state governments on trade issues).
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There are, however, few direct links between subnational governments and international decisionmaking structures. A union of local
elected officials enjoys consultative status at the UN, and municipal
authorities were an important force in the UN-sponsored Habitat II world
summit on housing and other problems common to urban governance
that was convened in Istanbul in the summer of 1996. Such subnational
geographic regions as Wales, the Basque land, and Catalonia have direct
official links to the central organs of the European Union.37 The
province of Quebec has a seat in the association of francophone states.
But that appears to be the extent of formal subnational participation in
international institutions.
Of course, this lack of status may be attributed to the fact that
subnational authorities, by definition, remain under the control of national
governments. Unlike corporations and NGOs, they are territorially fixed
and cannot exploit mobility and transnational identities to defeat central
government supervision. If the strength of central governments continues
to flag, however, this control may emerge more formal than real, at least
on some issues. In that case, the international significance of subnational
governments is likely to be further enlarged, regardless of the legal status
attributed to them under international law.

IV. NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY.
Notwithstanding the rise of non-state entities as part of the global
dynamic, states have effectively maintained their monopoly over the
levers of international law. With few exceptions, they have barred all
others from formal participation in the lawmaking process. States are the
sole repositories of international rights. They are also the sole repositories
of international duties.
That leaves the entities described above without rights or duties
under international law save those attached indirectly through states. Take
the example of an international environmental regime. Neither the NGO
Greenpeace, the corporation Royal Dutch Shell, nor the subnational
government of California has the right to participate in the negotiation
of that regime, and none correlatively has the direct obligation to accept
its competence.
The consequences of non-recognition under international law create

37. See Peter John, UK Subnational Ofices in Brussels: Diversificationor Regionalization,
28 REGIONAL STUD. 739 (1994); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions and the Role
of Regional Governments in the European Union, 20 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 413 (1997).
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an increasingly worrisome gulf between international law and international reality. On the one hand, certain transnational interests will not be
represented, or at least not fully represented, in a system that acknowledges the voice of states alone. The very fact that non-state groupings are
mobilizing at the international level is evidence of that shortcoming, for
they would have no need to mobilize were their positions adequately
advanced by state representatives. Any system based exclusively on
territorial definition will tend to exclude those groups that do not enjoy
territorial concentration.38 And states will always have an interest qua
states to limit the depth of international regulation. (The domestic
analogy might be to the matter of whether Congress is held to the laws
it imposes on everyone else. It will no doubt be more hesitant to legislate
to the extent that it is.) Non-state interests, many of which may represent
significant public constituencies, will thus go unrepresented or be
imperfectly represented in state-centric forums.
This last observation itself is controversial and could be the subject
of great debate. But assuming it to represent some truth, it tends to throw
the very legitimacy of the existing international lawmaking system into
doubt. That legitimacy will ultimately be determined by individuals and
by entities that command the discrete loyalties of those individuals. A
system which excludes certain organizational actors from deliberative
participation will not be considered legitimate by those organizations nor
in turn by its constituencies. Because a Greenpeace or an Amnesty
International is not formally included in the making of relevant international regimes, the process leading to those regimes may not be
considered legitimate by the organizations or their members and other
sympathetic constituencies. Those organizations and constituencies may
reject the regimes themselves as the product of a flawed and exclusionary
process.
Such rejection of international regimes could have significant
systemic consequences. Non-state actors are in a position to make good
on their rejection, thus threatening the efficacy of institutional decisionmaking. As described above, NGOs have deployed the power of
consumer action to some effect, even where the targeted actor is in full
compliance with international law. Such was true of Royal Dutch Shell

38. Gays would present the paradigmatic case. Even though they comprise by the most

conservative estimates at least a percent or two of human society, they will nowhere form a majority.
Thus, even if representation were perfectly democratic the worlds over, in an international system
based on territory this substantial population - larger than that of many states - would have no
independent voice in international decisionmaking.
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and disposal of the Brent Spar, and of France and its recent South Pacific
nuclear tests. And yet in both situations Greenpeace wanted more, and
in both cases it succeeded. To the extent that Greenpeace and other
NGOs succeed in these tactics, they in effect set the law. It will make no
difference whether state-negotiated treaties allow for oil-rig scuttling or
nuclear testing; as Gu6henno observes, "It matters little whether a norm
39
is imposed by a private enterprise or by a committee of bureaucrats."
So long as Greenpeace and others can mobilize significant consumer
interests to punish those who engage in these activities, they will not be
undertaken, or at least not without great cost.
The formal institutional process in that case becomes largely
irrelevant. That must presumptively be considered undesirable, for it is
in institutions that power is best held accountable. This brings into relief
the other side of the failure to afford non-state entities an enhanced
international legal personality, to wit, that such entities are not held
responsible under international law at the same time as they are not
permitted to participate in its making. Thus, were a state to impose
economic sanctions on France in the wake of its nuclear testing activity,
that state would likely be deemed to violate international law.40 But no
one would think similarly to accuse Greenpeace for what is in effect the
same action. Greenpeace is free to deploy its power as irresponsibly as
it so desires, as some would argue it did in the case of Brent Spar."
In this respect, the status (or lack thereof) of corporations is
similarly significant. The rationale for excluding corporations from
decisionmaking processes, as well as from international legal accountability systems, has been that corporations are ultimately creatures of a
particular state, and that the state will represent corporate interests at the
international level as well as ensure corporate compliance with international law requirements. This rationale lies at the core of international
law notions of state responsibility, under which states are held accountable for actors within their control.
As suggested, however, greater mobility of capital may put some
corporations beyond the effective control of states because mobility

39. GUEHENNO, supra note 2, at 58.
40. In fact, state opposition to the French testing was pursued, unsuccessfully, in the

International Court of Justice. See Request for an Examination of the Situation In Accordance With
Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement in Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), 1995 I.C.J. 288

(Sept. 22).
41. For an elaboration, see Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental
Organizationsin the 'Unregulated'Marketplace,18 CAnozo L. REV. 957 (1996).
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creates regulatory competition - a sort of international race to the
bottom - by allowing corporations to exploit the existence of states who
refuse to join supranational or parallel regulatory regimes. To the extent
this holds true (once again, the observation could be debated at length),
the premise for the law of state responsibility collapses. Little is gained
by holding a state responsible for something over which it has no power,
something akin to holding a parent responsible for a child who has
reached the age of majority.
Under the existing system of international law, insofar as corporations are not accountable to states, they are accountable to no one. The
gap is a troubling one because corporate behavior is often the ultimate
object of international legal norms. This is most obviously the case with
respect to worker rights, but also the environment and even human rights.
And yet a corporation that exploits labor, or pollutes the air or water, or
is complicit in the human rights abuses of a repressive government is no
international law violator because it has no international legal personality.
Finally, the same sort of observations could be made of subnational
governments, albeit to a lesser degree. They too may reject the legitimacy of a decisionmaking process which does not afford them a voice, at
least where their distinctive interests are at stake. For example, U.S. state
governments have expressed alarm at the prospect of international family
law conventions preempting their own laws in a sphere in which they
have traditionally held dominant as against the federal government. Such
resistance would no doubt be softened had state officials themselves a
seat at the international negotiating table. Similar difficulties are
presented with respect to international human rights norms implicating
criminal processes, the treatment of aliens, and trade.
Nor are subnational authorities as accountable to central governments as they once were. Although subnational units are not mobile in
the way that" corporations may be (territory doesn't move) they can
exercise another type of exit, namely, secession. In fragile nations, the
possibility of secession will afford a subnational entity substantial
leverage in dealing with the national government. But even in well-knit
nation-states, subnational authorities are not so easily cowed as perhaps
they once were,42 even where the issue is the subnational's own compliance with an international norm. On issues of intense concern at the
subnational level, national governments are sometimes unable for

42. See, e.g., James Podgers, Greetingsfrom 'Independent' Hawaii, A.B.AJ., June 1997, at
74; Celestine Bohlen, Italian's Callfor Breakup Stirs Storm, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, §1, at 4.
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political reasons to exercise internal discipline notwithstanding the
possibility of international complications. Thus, when California passed
Proposition 187, a ballot referendum aimed at discouraging the presence
of illegal aliens, the prospect of the federal government moving to
preempt the measure was nil, even in the face of strong Mexican
opposition to the subnational action (as well as the possibility that
California violated international human rights norms). As I have
elsewhere explained, the episode suggests an advantage to holding
subnational actors accountable for their actions under international
law.43
And yet subnationals, corporations, and NGOs will not be accountable so long as they have no formal status under international law. This
will work to the ultimate detriment of states and the international
lawmaking process. If states attempt to maintain their monopoly on
international law status, states and their international institutions will be
bypassed by these unrecognized but powerful non-state entities. The
failure of the international system thus in some respects works to the
advantage of non-state powers, who in effect get to have their cake and
eat it, too. Although states would ostensibly cede power by admitting
non-state actors into the club of international persons, they would also
regain the legal capacity, this time at the international level, to rein in
their new rivals.
V.

CONCLUSION.

The stakes here are enormous. History has shown that international
law, to the extent it does not account for the realities of the global
dynamic, becomes an irrelevancy. This was the lesson of the Cold War,
during which international law suffered wounds from which it is only
now recovering. The question of legal personality may pose an important
test for its capacity to adapt to new conditions on the ground. Entities
other than states are coming to command significant independent power
on the international stage. International law and institutions should move
to harness this new power to advance the state of global governance. If
instead it ignores what it cannot make go away, the law will itself
become a victim of its blindness.

43. See Spiro, supra note 34, at 175-76.

